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Executive Summary 
 
Every entrepreneur starting and growing a business faces a main challenge: to get financing. 
There are several sources of financing like the famous four F’s: founders, friends, family, and 
fools. A different source is the so-called Business Angels (BA). These are typically wealthy 
individuals who invest their own money in fledgling companies. BAs also provide support 
through advice, contacts, or hands-on work, based on their experience and knowledge as 
(current or former) successful entrepreneurs or business managers. Especially this latter 
contribution explains why these individuals are called “Angels”. 
A young company might also attract the interest of a professional investor – the Venture 
Capitalist (VC), who collects money form others and finances with this money privately held 
companies generally in the form of equity. The objective is to return the money with a high 
return. To ensure this the VC will also provide active hands on involvement in the development 
of the company. In comparison to the BA, who invests only his own money, VCs invest mostly 
other partners’ money and so are accountable for their investment to other people.  
While the BA has been hailed as an important source of financing for ventures that are still too 
small to raise the interest of a VC, in many companies there is co-financing between BAs and 
VCs. In this study, we focus on this type of investments and more specifically want to 
understand whether the BA-VC cooperation is valuable from the perspective of the VC. This 
question is of interest for both the founders of new ventures and BAs. It can help a founder to 
optimize the different stages of financing of the company and shows to the BAs which of their 
contributions are perceived as valuable and which ones are not. 
We show that based on the typical profile of BAs one can expect - which is confirmed in the 
literature - that BAs can add value through their involvement, simply by reducing the time 
input which VCs need to make, for example in monitoring and consulting on the investment. 
Accordingly, the availability of BAs as co-investors, equipped with the commercial, often 
sector-specific or entrepreneurial, know-how to undertake some elements of the time-
consuming and expensive post-investment relationship activity, can reduce the need for VCs 
themselves to add this value to an investment and therefore the BA can reduce the high costs in 
monitoring investments.  
With all their knowledge and expertise it seems reasonable to assume that co-investment with 
BAs should reduce the VC’s perceived risk of a deal and or co-investments with BAs should 
generate higher returns than deals without a BA.  
On the other hand many of the possible benefits for VC’s of co-investing with BAs can be offset 
by additional complications such as differences in management style, the increased complexity 
of decision-making having two types of investors involved (and the diversity of objectives 
which underlies this), and differences in personality and interests which could enhance, rather 
than mitigate, potential conflicts of interest and goal alignment.  
In the paper we attempt to clarify which of the competing explanations for the added value of 
BAs to a co-investment from the perspective of VCs is the most stringent. Specifically we test 
the three following hypotheses: 1) Co-investment with BAs does not reduce the VC’s perceived 
risk of a deal compared to deals without a BA. 2) VC’s goals and BA’s goals are becoming 
increasingly aligned; and 3) Co-investments with BAs do not generate higher returns than deals 
without a BA. 4 -  IESE Business School-University of Navarra 
The hypotheses are tested based on a sample of VCs from German-speaking countries. This 
helps to better understand the situation in Germany, Austria and Switzerland and the findings 
may have implications for other regions. 
Based on the answers of representative sample of 59 VCs on the role and importance of 
BAs as co-investors we conclude that: 
 
1.  VCs do not perceive the presence of a BA to be a source of risk reduction. Hence, either 
VCs value neither the BAs’ ability to monitor investments, nor their often reported high 
level of relevant experience and networks. 
 
2.  The VCs’ goals and BAs’ goals are getting more aligned in the German speaking 
countries.  
 
3.  According to the VCs, the level of returns from investments with BAs is not higher than 
from those without.  
 
Given that VCs see neither a reduction in risk nor and increase of returns through the presence 
of BAs, the value of BAs to VCs is put seriously in doubt. The involvement of BAs is perceived 
by VCs to be irrelevant to their assessment of an early stage deal. This is important news to 
founders who need to understand the BA-VC relationship when planning the financing of their 









DO BUSINESS ANGELS ALTER THE RISK-RETURN 
EQUATION IN EARLY STAGE INVESTMENTS? 
 
BUSINESS ANGELS AS SEEN BY VENTURE CAPITALISTS  





Interest in the role of the informal investor in the venture capital market has increased steadily 
since the identification of the Business Angel (BA) as a source of capital in the financing of 
business start-ups. In particular, BAs and other informal investors reduce the so-called ‘equity 
gap’ – the range in which most institutional investors will not fund. This is one of the 
conclusions of various studies conducted in the USA (see Freear et al., 2002 for an overview), in 
Australia (Hindle and Wenban, 1999, the UK Mason and Harrison, 1999, Singapore (Hindle and 
Lee, 2002, and in the Nordic region (e.g. Landström, 1995, Lumme et al. (1998), Reitan and 
Sørheim (2000).  
Several researchers have sought to identify the typical attitudes, behaviors and characteristics 
(ABCs) of a BA in an attempt better to understand the informal risk capital market (see for 
example, Brettel, 2003; Freear et al., 2000; Kollmann, 2004; Stedler and Peters, 2003, and 
Wetzel (1983)]. Findings from this research generally suggest that BAs are high net worth 
individuals with significant management experience who put their money, knowledge and time 
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A particularly interesting field of the venture capital market is co-investments between BAs and 
Venture Capitalists (VCs). In contrast to BAs, VCs are intermediaries between investors and 
entrepreneurs. The presence of a BA in a joint investment is potentially beneficial to a VC: 
Although the interests of BAs might not be perfectly aligned with those of VCs, their experience 
and time involvement should decrease the risk involved in an early stage investment, or 
increase returns for otherwise similar risks. The reduction in risk could be based on the BA’s 
informed and active monitoring and support of the early stage investment; and it appears that 
the amount of time spent by the typical BA on deals could add value by reducing the time 
necessary to be spent by the VC. In addition, the experience and networks that BAs can bring 
to the early stage venture could also potentially lead to an increase in returns. 
This suggests that a co-investment with a BA should be beneficial for a VC. Stanco and Akah 
(2005) show that indeed only 12% of the VCs the surveyed in the US do not co-invest with BAs 
and Harrison and Mason (2000) also see the VCs benefit based on some evidence from the USA 
and the UK. Moreover, for BAs, co-investments are desirable: Mason and Harrison (2002) show 
in a study on returns of venture capital deals in the UK that co-investments with VCs yield 
significantly higher returns than BA/BA co-investments or deals in which BAs are alone.   
On the other hand, in an effort better to understand the investment practices employed by 
successful BAs in Germany, Amis et al. (2003) interviewed several so called “Winning Angels” 
in a non-representative study which gave a slightly different picture. The BAs involved in the 
Amis study seemed to consider that, overall, VCs do not perceive them as decreasing the risk 
involved in a deal, firstly because the VCs consider themselves to be the qualified and 
professional investment experts, and secondly because the surveyed BAs considered their 
interests to be in conflict with those of VCs, albeit to a diminishing extent (Amis, 2003). 
Finally, the BAs acknowledged that co-investments with them might not produce higher returns 
for the VCs for otherwise similar risks.
1 Harrison and Mason (2000) – in addition to the 
evidence cited above – also found evidence pointing in this direction. Although most of the 
VCs they surveyed indicated that, all other things being equal, the presence of a BA would 
make them more likely to make follow-on investments, they saw distinct disadvantages in co-
investing with BAs and a few had even adopted a policy of not co-investing with BAs at all. 
This disparity in perceptions of the value in VC-BA co-investment on a deal calls for further 
research into the dynamics of the VC-BA relationship, specifically from the perspective of the 
VCs. Aside from Harrison and Mason (2000), we are not aware of any published research in 
which the rationale for VCs to co-invest with BAs is the central focus, although other 
researchers have highlighted some of the complementarities between investing by venture 
capitalists (VCs) and BAs (see for example Chemmanur and Chen, 2003; Gifford, 1997; Gill et 
al., 2000, and Lau, 1999). This contrasts starkly with the extent of research into other 
investment criteria and practices applied by VCs in Europe (Manigart et al., 1997; Mason and 
Stark, 2004; Muzyka et al., 1996 and Sweeting, 1991). 
In addition, the evidence to support the added BA-value in a co-investment (e.g. Harrison and 
Mason, 2000) is based on data from the USA and UK while the critique in the context of the 
Amis et al. (2003) study is based on evidence from Germany. Thus, while the question of BA-
VC co-investments as such is completely general, the different views might be caused partly by 
regional differences. Aside from Brettel (2003), Kollmann (2004) and Stedler and Peters (2003), 
                                              
1 Note that Gottschalg et al. (2004) report that venture capital returns in general seem to be low for the risk being 
taken.  
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the informal investment market in the German-speaking countries has not been the object of 
scientific studies. Indeed, appropriate data on Austria and Switzerland is almost entirely absent.  
In this paper, we attempt to reduce these deficits, by studying the BA-VC relationship from the 
VCs’ perspective, based on empirical data from a survey of 59 VCs who operate in the German-
speaking countries. 
This research could be beneficial as entrepreneurship constitutes a vital competitive edge in 
world markets and BAs are the primary source of equity financing for start-up and early stage 
entrepreneurial ventures. In particular, founders of new ventures need to understand the VC-BA 
relationship to arrange the financing of their venture in an optimal way. 
In addition, the investments of self-made, high-net-worth individuals are one of the least 
understood economic resources in general and particularly in the German-speaking countries 
where ambiguous comments have appeared in the media,
2 concerning the value of interaction 
between BAs and VCs. In summary, we strive to test the commonly held assumption that BAs 
add value to VC-BA co-investments beyond a level that VCs could reach in other types of deals 
(i.e. without BAs). 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section I provides a brief description of the venture capital 
industry and its relevant participants. Section II develops three specific hypotheses about the 
VC-BA investment relationship that we seek to test. Section III describes the characteristics of 
our dataset of 59 VCs; it also discusses the possible incidence of sample bias and other potential 
limitations. Section IV presents our empirical findings and discusses our results in comparison 
to the predictions of prevailing theories. Finally, Section V provides a summary and some 
concluding remarks. 
II. Venture Capital and Business Angels 
A. Venture Capital 
Definitions of venture capital usually focus on four characteristics (Brander et al., 2002). Three 
of these are emphasized by the following definition from Schilit (1991): “venture capital can be 
thought of as [1] financing for privately held companies, [2] generally in the form of equity 
and/or long term convertible debt … The venture capitalist, like the banker, serves [3] as an 
intermediary - or conduit - between the investors …and the entrepreneurs”. The fourth 
characteristic is highlighted in the definition given by Kunze (1990): “The combination of 
equity participation plus [4] active involvement in the development of the company is what 
distinguishes venture capital from all other investment vehicles”. In this paper we will use the 
term “Venture Capital” as defined by the European Private Equity and Venture Capital 
Association (EVCA), i.e. early stage financing (seed, start-up and other early stage) and 
expansion financing. The financing stages are explained below in Subsection C. 
 
                                              
2 “Business Angel” – Interview with J. Hemer (Süddeutsche Zeitung – April 17, 1999), “Der Rambo im Nadelstreif" – 
Interview with H.O. Henkel (Der Standard – October 12, 2000), “Platow-Brief-Business Angels schreckt das Neue 
Markt-Tief wenig “ (Platow Brief – April 19, 2001), “Business Angels bersten schier vor Tatendrang “ (Financial 
Times Deutschland – January 10, 2002).  
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B. Business Angels 
The intermediation aspect of venture capital and the size of the deals is what distinguish VCs 
from BAs. BAs are typically wealthy individuals who invest their own money in fledgling 
companies [Brander et al. (2002)]. By comparison, VCs invest other partners’ money and so are 
more accountable for their investment (Leshchinskii, (2002). BAs, who are typically (current or 
former) successful entrepreneurs or business managers, also provide support through advice, 
contacts, or hands-on work (Amis et al., (2001). 
C. Financing Stages 
Venture capital finance is a dynamic activity in that there are many stages in the financing 
process. The differentiation between stages is somewhat arbitrary, but following the 
categorization by the EVCA (2004) and Brander et al. (2002), we distinguish the six following 
stages: 
•  The earliest stage is referred to as seed investment and is provided to research, assess and 
develop an initial concept before a business has reached the start-up phase. Investments are 
often based on a single individual with an idea and relevant expertise, and the BA or VC 
may assist in forming a company.  
 
•  The next chronological stage is start-up financing. This is provided to companies for 
product development and initial marketing. Companies may be in the process of being set 
up or may have been in business for a short time, but have not sold their product 
commercially.  
 
•  Other early-stage financing is provided to companies that have completed the product 
development stage and require further funds to initiate commercial manufacturing and 
sales. They will not yet be generating a profit. 
 
•  The fourth stage is referred to as expansion financing and is provided for the growth and 
expansion of an operating company, which may or may not be breaking even or trading 
profitably. Capital may be used to finance increased production capacity, market or product 
development, and/or to provide additional working capital. This stage also includes bridge 
financing (made available to a company in the period of transition from being privately 
owned to being publicly quoted) and rescue/turnaround financing (made available to an 
existing business which has experienced trading difficulties, with a view to re-establishing 
prosperity). 
 
•  The fifth, later stage encompasses secondary purchase/replacement capital finance (the 
purchase of existing shares in a company from another private equity investment 
organization or from another shareholder or shareholders) and refinancing bank debt 
(financing to reduce a company’s level of gearing). 
 
•  Finally, there is a stage of financing focused on a special-purpose for a mature, privately 
held company, including leveraged buyouts (financing provided to enable the acquisition of 
an existing product line or business) or the venture purchase of quoted shares (purchase of 
quoted shares with the purpose of delisting the company). 
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Within each stage there may be more than one round of investments. The amount of time 
associated with each stage is variable, but a horizon of about a year each is typical for the first 
four stages. Later stage financing more commonly stretches out over two or more years, and 
special-purpose  investments are usually one-time investments that might be made anytime 
after the first four stages are complete (Brander et al., 2002). See Gompers and Lerner (1999b) 
for further discussion on the various stages of VC investing. 
III. Assessing the VC–BA Relationship 
A. Potential Value of BAs 
Brander et al. (2002) found in their analysis on returns to Canadian venture-capital 
investments, that syndicated investments (VC-VC) have significantly higher returns (in both the 
statistical and the economic sense) than standalone investments. They concluded that this was 
because different VCs can add different value to ventures as a result of their different skills and 
information: some might be helpful in organizing production, others might line up customers, 
other might contribute human-resource management, etc.  
Several reasons have been given for why the conclusions found by Brander et al. (2002) in 
syndications should also apply to BA-VC co-investments.  
Gifford (1997) and Harrison and Mason (2000) suggest that BAs can add value through their 
performance of non-executive director functions, simply by reducing the time input which VCs 
need to make, for example in monitoring and consulting on the investment. Accordingly, the 
availability of BAs as co-investors, equipped with the commercial, often sector-specific or 
entrepreneurial, know-how to undertake some elements of the time-consuming and expensive 
post-investment relationship activity, can reduce the need for VCs themselves to add value to 
an investment (Harrison and Mason, 2000, and Lau, 1999). 
In addition, in the relationship between a VC and invested company, informational 
asymmetries, conflicts of interest and goal alignment that can give rise to moral may be 
effectively resolved through monitoring by an inside investor such as a BA. As an investor the 
BA not only provides capital but typically also works closely with the firm, monitors it 
frequently, observes the private information about the project’s profitability, becomes involved 
in making the subsequent investment decisions, and is generally well informed about the firm’s 
prospects (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994). Clearly, VCs can also protect themselves ex-ante from 
information asymmetries and moral hazards Van Osnabrugge, 2000) by injecting capital in 
stages, by awarding incentive compensation to the entrepreneur, by using stringent contractual 
provisions, by specializing in particular industry sectors (Mason and Stark, 2004) and by 
syndication as a means to draw on other VCs’, perhaps more specialized, monitoring 
capabilities (Lockett and Wright, 1999). 
However, the VCs incur high costs in monitoring investments; and, as Gompers (1995) has 
observed: “If venture capitalists need to ‘kick the tires’ of the plant, read reports, and take time 
away from other activities, these costs can be substantial.” Thus, relying on help provided by 
BAs in joint investments could be the better alternative for VCs.  
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B. Commitment of BAs 
There is considerable evidence in Germany, in particular, that BAs might be willing to serve this 
monitoring role. Brettel (2003) found that over 90% of the 48 BAs surveyed stated that they 
were involved (21%) or actively involved (75%) in the supervisory board, the advisory council 
and the shareholders’ meetings of the invested company and provided informal advisory help. 
These findings are consistent with Van Osnabrugge (2000), who found that BAs monitor more 
actively their investments ex post than VCs do.
3 As Fiet (1995a) notes, one explanation for this 
level of commitment by BAs might be that they are relatively more comfortable in their abilities 
to deal effectively with business risk. 
The extent of BAs’ commitment is also reflected in the considerable amount of time they spend 
on their investments: an issue that is particularly relevant for ventures in their earliest stages of 
development (Kelly and Hay, 1996). Brettel (2003) reports an average of 6.2 days a month that 
BAs spend on their investments; corresponding to an average of 1.34 days a month per 
investment (see also Stedler and Peters, 2003). This can be contrasted with an estimate for the 
U.S. that a VC typically allows less than two hours per week per investment (Zider, 1998). 
C. BA Qualifications 
Furthermore, Brettel (2003) found BAs in Germany to be particularly well qualified for this 
monitoring role. The vast majority of the interviewed BAs were experienced business people; 
altogether, over 85% of the BAs interviewed had management experience in small and 
medium-sized companies with an average of 12.5 years; the majority reported their main area 
of functional expertise to be in corporate management (80%) and finance (60%), with sales and 
marketing tailing (at 20%-30% each). In addition, Kelly and Hay (1996) noted that, like VCs, 
BAs prefer to invest in markets and/or technologies which are familiar to them or in which they 
have had some direct experience (see also Landström, 1993). Brettel (2002) found that the most 
significant contributions of BAs are often the use of their personal networks, their marketing, 
strategy and management experience, their knowledge of the industry and their help with 
recruiting executive personnel. BAs are also self-confident about their value-added: Stedler and 
Peters (2003) found that the BAs surveyed in Germany considered that they themselves could 
deliver the largest know-how contribution to the investment. 
D. Alignment of Interests 
However, some VCs have mixed views on the value of the contribution made by BAs and the 
general alignment of interests. As Harrison and Mason (2000) observed, many of the possible 
benefits of co-investing with BAs can be offset by their differences in approach, the increased 
complexity of decision-making having two types of investors involved (and the diversity of 
objectives which underlies this), and differences in personality and interests. In particular, they 
found that BAs have, in general, different investment criteria from VCs with the result that their 
involvement can even enhance, rather than mitigate, conflicts of interest and goal alignment. 
In the USA less sophisticated BAs are often seen as overpaying at the seed stage, making 
realistic valuations difficult for follow-on investment (Gill et al., 2000). Harrison and Mason 
(2000) identified a similar perception among VCs in the UK. The study by Brettel (2003) into the 
German informal venture capital market showed that, although 46% of the 48 BAs surveyed 
                                              
3 By comparison, van Osnabrugge found VCs to be much more efficient than BAs in the ex ante deal origination and 
initial screening processes. This might also explain, Lockett and Wright’s finding (1999) that ex post management of 
investments was a more important motivation than ex ante selection for VC syndication.  
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considered high capital growth to be very important, the main motivation of BAs to act as BAs 
was to have fun: with 81% considering this very important; and only 2% considering this not 
important
4.  
Another potential lack of alignment of interests might stem from differences in investment 
objectives between VCs and BAs. Freear et al. (2002) observe for the UK and the USA that BAs 
invest for objectives other than financial return, including the fun and excitement of being 
involved in the ventures in which they invest. Moreover, one of Brettel’s conclusions was 
damning: “the German informal venture capital market – in spite of its earning potential – is 
still largely in the stage of being a ‘hobby market’”. This assessment of BA motivations 
contrasts starkly with the more typical investment criteria of VCs, namely financial returns 
(Harrison and Mason, 1992; Landström, 1993, and Freear et al. (1995); and is probably born of 
the fact that BAs invest their own money, while VCs are intermediaries between entrepreneurs 
and large institutions, such as pension funds, banks and insurance companies. It might even be 
observed that, in many ways, the motivations of BAs seem more to match those of the 
entrepreneur than those of the VC with the potential of enhancing, rather than mitigating, 
conflicts of interest – and moral hazard – due to the informal and personal influence BAs often 
exact over their investments’ founders. 
Said so, there is also evidence that these potentially additional monitoring and agency costs are 
decreasing in recent years, at least in the German-speaking countries (Stedler and Peters, 2003), 
and Kollmann (2004). In contrast to Brettel’s (2003) findings that fun was the main motivation 
for investing by the 48 BAs surveyed, Stedler and Peters (2003) found that the main 
motivations of the 232 BAs whom they surveyed were: first, to exploit and profit from their 
professional experience (82%); and second, the chance of a higher return on investment (77%). 
E. Assessing the VC–BA Relationship: Conclusions 
In conclusion, our preliminary research using a value-adding perspective on the available 
empirical evidence suggests that:  
1.  Co-investments with BAs can reduce the VCs’ perceived risk of a deal, compared to a deal 
where no BA is present. 
 
2.   VCs’ and BAs’ goals are becoming increasingly aligned, and 
 
3.  Co-investments with BAs should generate higher returns for projects with similar risk due 
to the potential value-added by BAs. 
 
While the second statement has recently been somewhat substantiated in the German-speaking 
countries (Stedler and Peters, 2003), the first and third statement clearly remain open to 
challenge. 
In light of this analysis, our study seeks to corroborate the following, inter-related hypotheses: 
H1: Co-investment with BAs does not reduce the VC’s perceived risk of a deal compared 
to deals without a BA. 
                                              
4 This lack of focus on purely economic considerations is also reflected in Brettel’s (2003) findings that only 14% of 
the BAs considered the exit strategy to be a very important factor to take into account in assessing investments: by 
contrast, this is a much higher priority for VCs (Harrison and Mason (2002), van Osnabrugge (2000)).  
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H2: VC’s goals and BA’s goals are becoming increasingly aligned. 
H3: Co-investments with BAs do not generate higher returns than deals without a BA. 
We limit our study to BAs in the German-speaking countries, although our findings may have 
implications for other regions. 
IV. Empirical Foundations 
A. Description of Sample 
We analyzed perceptions of 59 VCs on the role and importance of BAs as co-investors. To 
obtain our sample, we identified our population of interest as 173 VCs investing in seed, start-
up, other early-stage and/or expansion stages of venture capital financing in the German-
speaking countries: Austria, Germany and Switzerland. The VCs were identified from the 
membership lists of the Austrian Private Equity and Venture Capital Organization (AVCO), the 
Bundesverband Deutscher KBG’s German Venture Capital Association (BVK) and the Swiss 
Private Equity and Corporate Finance Association (SECA). We also cross-referred these lists 
with those VCs registered as investing in these stages and countries with the European Private 
Equity and Venture Capital Association (EVCA) and with entrepreneur/VC and BA networks (in 
particular, Europe-Unlimited and Brains-To-Ventures).
5 This was intended to counteract any 
bias inherent in drawing a sample from just one source. Also, to exclude defunct firms from the 
sample, we checked via telephone and/or their webpage that they were still in operation. 
We emailed a copy of our questionnaire to the 173 VCs and after two weeks sent further emails 
to non-responding VCs. We followed up with telephone calls on the non responding VCs and 
through personal contacts that existed to 47 of the VCs identified. We promised respondents 
that, in preparing a report on our findings, we would not identify the investment performance 
or practices of any particular VC by name; we have respected that promise in this paper. 
In all cases, only one response was sought from each office. This anticipated the widespread 
custom in VC partnerships to delegate questionnaires and other information requests to one 
partner, to reduce the firm’s workload, and was intended to increase the participation rate. The 
effect of this restriction may have led to a slight downward bias in the estimates of the value of 
co-investing with BAs (for example, in relation to their time-saving advantages referred to 
above in Section II). However, anecdotal evidence suggests that the management culture of VC 
firms in the region is such that partners are generally well informed of their colleagues’ project 
portfolios.  
The questionnaire consisted of 20 questions and addressed investment attitude, experience and 
aggregate financial activity and performance. Ideally, to answer our research questions, data on 
the characteristics and financial performance of individual investments would be studied but it 
is not available. The questionnaire required approximately 25 minutes to complete and is 
reproduced in Appendix A.  
                                              
5 These organisations operate like ‘dating agencies’, providing a communication channel, that enables BAs to review 
investment opportunities, while preserving their anonymity, and allows entrepreneurs seeking finance to present 
their investment opportunity to a large number of potential investors (Harrison and Mason, 1996).  
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We ended up with an overall response rate of 75%. The 129 responses included 59 answered 
questionnaires. The remaining 70 respondents indicated that they did not fill in the 
questionnaire for the following reasons: 
1)  Act as fund of funds (32%). 
2)  Too busy (18%). 
3)  Wrong person contacted (14%). 
4)  Firm policy is not to participate in questionnaires (11%). 
5)  Change of investment strategy rendered them irrelevant to the study (7%), and 
6)  Do not co-invest with BAs (7%). 
7)  Other reasons (11%). 
 
The 59 answered questionnaires correspond to an effective participation rate of 34%. 
Unique Dataset 
Of the 59 effective participants, the average VC first invested with a BA in 1998 and has 
participated in 3 investments with BAs in the three years to August 2004, compared to 19 
investments in early stage deals without BAs. All of the 59 effective participants have invested with 
BAs at some point during the past three years. This data cannot be benchmarked against any 
industry standard as no data is currently available on the total number of early stage deals with or 
without BA participation. Table 1 summarizes the geographical distribution of these investments.  
 
Table 1. Question numbers refer to the questionnaire reproduced in 
Appendix A 
Geographical Distribution of Early Stage VC Investment 
 Average  Average    Average 
  first year of  Investments #  Investments # 
Headquarters  with BA investment  Bas in 2001-03 of with  Bas in 2001-03 of w/o 
Austria 1999  2  34 
Germany 1998  3  18 
Switzerland 1998  5  17 
Not defined  2001  1  7 
All funds  1998  3  19 
Source: Questions 1 and 8. 
 
Table 2 presents the distribution of funds under management, by region, in our sample, as 
compared to that of the population. The average amount of funds managed is approximately 
€180 million. This is slightly lower than the €222 million average amount of funds managed by 
all early stage VCs in the region, as reported to EVCA and the respective national private equity 
and venture capital organizations. The differences chiefly arise in respect of funds 
headquartered in Austria and Switzerland, which comprise less than 25% of the population of 
interest (see Table 3). 
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Table 2 
VC fund size (€ Million)
6: Comparison of sample and population average in the three countries 
Headquarters Population  Sample 
Austria      155  222 
Germany 202  202 
Switzerland 341  118 
Not defined  6  6 
Average 222  181 
Sources: For the population AVCO, BVK, SECA and EVCA. For the sample, background question. 
 
Table 3 presents the geographical distribution of the headquarters of VCs in our sample, as 
compared to that of the population surveyed. This distribution is roughly consistent with the 




Geographical Location of VC Headquarters in sample and population 
 
Headquarters 
# of funds in  Percentage  # of funds  Percentage 
  population  of population  in sample  of sample 
Austria 8  5  4  7 
Germany 130  75  40  68 
Switzerland 34  20  14  24 
Not defined  1  1  1  2 
All funds  173  100  59  100 
Sources: AVCO, BVK, SECA and EVCA. 
 
The VCs in our sample, therefore, seem broadly representative of VCs in the German-speaking 
countries. 
B. Potential Bias and Restrictions 
Before we present our results, it is worth pointing out potential biases concerning our sample.  
Non-Response Bias 
First, there is the possibility of non-response bias: the 28% of the population that did not 
respond to our survey may include a higher proportion of VCs who are critical of, or at least 
indifferent to, the contribution of BAs. As a result, they may have declined to participate in our 
survey simply because they dislike, or are indifferent to, the prospect of co-investing with BAs 
on early stage deals and hence perceive the survey as not relevant to them. 
However, there is no indication that our sample is biased in this way. We tested this by 
identifying for each element in our sample various firm-specific characteristics: funds under 
                                              
6 Two outliers were removed from the population. Only a small part of their business is in early stage deals.  
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management, number of employees, industry focus and geographical location. We then 
compared these to the characteristics of the VCs in the population. The results of this test did 
not highlight any significant differences between the respondents in our sample and the 
surveyed population.  
The personal contacts used to retrieve answers from VCs could also potentially bias the results 
although there is no obvious difference between them and the population at large and all non-
responding VCs were approached by telephone.  
Stage/Sector Bias 
Second, there is the possibility of what we refer to as stage/sector bias: the focus of our study 
was VCs who invest in early stage deals. Although no data is currently available on the relative 
number of early stage deals with or without BA involvement, early stage deals are generally 
perceived to be more likely to involve BAs than other stages of private equity. As a result, VCs 
who work in early stage deals may value the contribution of BAs more than those who do not. 
To put it another way, VCs who are critical of, or at least indifferent to, the contribution of 
BAs, may prefer not to focus on early stage deals, but rather focus on later stage deals or on 
other areas of private equity not included within the scope of our survey.  
This bias cannot be excluded as we do not observe the VCs that avoid early stage deals. 
However, we found no indication that our sample is biased in this way. All of the 59 effective 
respondents reported that they have co-invested both with and without BAs in the last four 
years; and, of the remaining 70 respondents, only five mentioned not working with BAs as a 
reason for their non-participation in the survey.  
Scale/Experience Bias 
Third, there is the possibility of what we refer to as scale/experience bias: if BA co-investments 
give rise to larger ventures, then perhaps it is scale rather than co-investment that explains 
differences in attitudes to BAs, or other measures. Such scale effects might arise if either 
economies of scale or capital constraints induce an apparent advantage from size (Brander et 
al., 2002). 
In a similar vein, differences might be explained by the relative experience of VCs: it has been 
observed that being experienced increases the expected profitability of a VC fund (Gottschalg et 
al. 2004; Gompers and Lerner, 1999a, and Kaplan and Schoar, 2003).  
However, when analyzing our results, we have corrected for the size of the fund, for the VCs’ 
years of experience and the number of BA co-investments. All of these variables turned out to 
be insignificant, and do not affect our main findings concerning BA co-investment.  
Cycle Bias 
Fourth, there is the possibility of what we refer to as cycle bias: differences in attitudes to BAs 
and other measures might be largely explained in the context of the prevailing investment 
market cycle. As Gottschalg et al. (2004) have noted, private equity funds can be exposed to 
substantial “left tail risk”, that is, they deliver significantly higher losses during large market 
downturns (when there is no exit market and so no cash distribution to investing partners) but 
are not as sensitive to economic conditions in good times. This study was conducted in the 
summer/autumn 2004 and may also reflect the economic sentiments of that period. 
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Self-Reporting Bias 
More difficult to correct, is the possibility that self-reported, retrospective data can be subject to 
conscious or unconscious errors associated with one-sided (VC only) bias; as well as with post 
hoc rationalization and recall bias (Mason and Stark, 2004).  
It cannot be excluded that when comparing returns on investments with or without 
participation of BAs, VCs might be comparing investments with substantially distinct risk 
profiles. 
V. Empirical Results 
In the context of our empirical results, we define four control variables based on published and 
self-reported data by the participants. These are:  
1)  The size of the fund in monetary terms (size) (published). 
 
2)  The experience of the VC in number of years since their first co-investment with a BA 
(experience) (self-reported). This seems to be the relevant variable in what concerns 
relationships to BAs rather than general experience in private equity although it might 
coincide in many cases. 
 
3)  Their level of activity as the sum of projects in the years 2000-2004 (relations) (self-
reported).  
 
4)  A dummy variable for the country of origin (Germany, Austria, Switzerland) (published).  
 
Table 4 displays the summary statistics of the first three control variables. 
 
Table 4 
Summary Statistics of Control Variables 
    Experience (years)  Relations (#) 
  Size (Million Euros)  (Time since first  (Number of co-investments 
Variable  (Fund size)  co-investment with Bas)  with Bas in 2001-2003) 
 
Mean  180.70 6.60 10.07 
ST. Dev.  311.01  4.63  2.12 
Source: Background question, questions 1 and 8. 
 
A. Hypothesis 1 
The empirical test for our first hypothesis, that co-investment with BAs does not reduce the 
VC’s perceived risk of a deal, is straightforward: We asked VCs to nominate the top three 
characteristics that they look for in a BA; and if they would apply lower discount rates in 
valuing co-investments with BAs who feature those three characteristics than they would 
in valuing investments without BAs. We also asked the VCs to quantify the maximum  
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decrease in discount rate, if any, in assessing a deal as a result of this BA involvement and 
compared this to the discount rates which the VCs reported they applied, as a general rule of 
thumb, across seed, start-up, other early and expansion financing stages. 
The basis for using discount rates as a measure of the VC’s perceived risk of a deal reflects the 
general perception that, because outside investors recognize risk (including the possibility of 
information asymmetry and moral hazard), they demand a higher rate of return than would be 
the case if the funds were internally generated (Lerner, 1998). Indeed, this relationship between 
perceived risk and applied discount rates seems to be born out in our findings. Table V present 
the average discount rates that VCs reported across the early investment stages. 
 
Table 5 
Discount Rates in percent Applied by VCs According to Stage of Investment 
  Percentage Percentage Percentage 
Investment Stage  Avg.  Min.  Max. 
Seed (Concept Only)  50  20  100 
Start-up (No Sales)  46  20  100 
Other Early (No Profit)  37  15  60 
Expansion (Growth)  30  10  50 
Source: Question 4. 
 
We observe that there is noticeably less of a consensus (and so higher variance) among VCs on 
the range of discount rates applied to seed and start-up investments than to other early stage 
and expansion investments. 
As to VC perceptions of BAs (see Table VI), we found that the 3 characteristics of BAs most 
looked for by VCs were: sector experience (nominated by 88% of VCs, for an average of 10 
years), good business contacts (81%, average of 50 contacts), such as with potential suppliers, 
customers and possible trade buyers, and sales experience (nominated by 54%, average of 8 
years).   
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Table 6 
Characteristics Most Looked for by VCs in BA Co-Investments 
 
# of VCs 
who Percentage  of     
Characteristic  mention  VCs who mention it  Average Measure 
        
Sector experience  52  88  10  Years 
        
Good business contacts  48  81  50  # of contacts 
        
Sales experience  32  54  8  Years 
        
Investment record  21  36  4  Deals 
        
Time availability  10  17  29  Hours/Month 
        
R&D/technical expertiste  5  8  7  Years 
        
Understanding of growth        
technology and VC process  1  2  1  Deal with VC 
        
Cash 1  2  100,000  Euros 
        
Leadership 1  2  N/A  N/A 
        
Business Building  1  2  1  Deal 
Source: Question 3. 
 
When we explicitly asked the participating VCs whether they would apply lower discount rates 
when investing together with an ideal BA, i.e. a BA that has the three most important characteristics 
stated by the VC, the results show that almost half (46%) of the VCs indicated that they would never 
apply lower discount rates (see Table VII). Only 34% indicated that they would sometimes apply 
lower discount rates in valuing such co-investments; including 10% who indicated that they would 
do so often. In an ordered probity regression model, none of our control variables defined at the 
beginning of this section was statistically significant at the p = 5% level. 
 
Table 7 
Would you Decrease the Discount Rate if BAs meet the top three characteristics (see Table 6) 
   Percentage 
Answer  # of VCs  of VCs 
Never 27  46 
Sometimes 12  20 
Often 2  2 
Always 0  0 
Don't know  18  31 
Total 59  100 
Source: Question 5.  
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In addition, only 8.5% of the participating VCs stated that they would increase the BA’s equity 
allocation if the BA featured the top three characteristics looked-for. This evidence broadly 
supports Harrison and Mason’s (2000) findings that VCs apply the same investment criteria to 
BA co-investments than to VC investments without BAs; and bears out the argument 
underlying our first hypothesis that VCs do not perceive the opportunity to co-invest with BAs 
as a way of reducing risk, as measured by the discount rate applied.  
On the basis of these findings, we conclude that our first hypothesis, that co-investment with 
BAs does not reduce the VC’s perceived risk of a deal compared to deals without a BA, cannot 
be rejected. 
B. Hypothesis 2 
The empirical test for our second hypothesis, that VC’s goals and BA’s goals are becoming 
increasingly aligned, is less straightforward than that for our first hypothesis.  
First, we sought to identify VCs’ motivations by asking VCs if attitudes between VCs and BAs 
are worsening. 
Second, we divided VC contractual clauses, and their underlying concerns, into two generic 
groups – which we labeled, “money” and “influence” - to analyze the simultaneous pursuit of 
these two different objectives in an investment. We refer to the term “influence”, rather than to 
concepts of “fun” or “excitement”, on the premise that it is through influence that BAs will be 
able to extract fun and excitement from an investment.
7 
Examples of concerns pursuing “money” objectives included: valuations on financing rounds 
and the ability of BAs to take part in subsequent financing rounds. Examples of clauses 
included: dividend rights or multiple liquidation provisions (i.e. whereby the VC receives a cash 
multiple of his/her investment on any liquidation or exit, regardless of its nature). A complete 
list of the concerns categorized under “money” is presented in Table VIII. 
Examples of concerns pursuing “influence” objectives included: the ability of BAs to influence 
the hiring/firing of the senior management of the invested company; and to influence the 
operations or strategy of the business. Examples of clauses included: rights to appoint a board 
member or special voting rights on changes to management. This is because in the German-
speaking countries (as elsewhere) the rights to control or make corporate decisions are provided 
in board rights and in voting rights (Kaplan and Strömberg 2003), and the board is generally 
responsible for hiring, evaluating, and firing top management; and advising and ratifying 
general corporate strategies and decisions.
8 A complete list of the concerns categorized under 
“influence” is presented in Table VIII. 
Finally, we assessed the relative importance of these goals to BAs by asking VC respondents 
about the frequency of the related clauses and concerns becoming almost or truly ‘deal-
breakers’ with BAs. By ‘deal-breaker’, we mean the issues that resulted in the VC not investing 
in a deal or in the VC not participating in following rounds. The phrasing of the corresponding 
                                              
7 We also refer to a range of areas of influence, rather than to a narrower concept of control, since, as Kaplan and 
Strömberg (2003) and Kirilenko (2001) have argued, control is more of a multi-dimensional and continuous concept 
than a simple dichotomous, “Yes” or “No” variable. 
8 Certain corporate actions, however, are governed or subject to shareholder votes. These vary across firms, but 
sometimes include large acquisitions, asset sales, subsequent financings, election of directors, or any other actions 
stipulated by contract (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003).  
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questions (10 and 11) in the questionnaire (see Appendix) also extends to severe compromises 
that jeopardize the deal. We asked the VCs to assess frequency on a scale of 1 to 4, where 1 
signified “extremely rarely” and 4, “extremely frequently”.  
Before we present our results, it is worth noting that objectives going to “money” and concerns 
going to “influence” will to an extent overlap; for example, a BA’s desire for influence may in 
fact be fuelled by a desire to protect the financial investment.
9 However, we consider that the 
frequency of these issues becoming ‘deal-breakers’ provides a powerful signal about the BAs’ 
expected payoff from the co-investment. As one VC (quoted in Landström et al., 1998) explains, 
“you put [contractual clauses] down on paper… that’s when you really begin to know each 
other… the things that they think are important to them tell you a lot about them… it’s a way to 
figure out what the other person is all about, not just what they say they are all about”.  
Table VIII presents the results from this question by displaying the average score of each 
criterion and the numbers of VCs stipulating them in the form of a pie chart. From the results, 
it appears that “money” objectives are perceived by VCs to be clearly more likely to be ‘deal-
breakers’ than “influence” objectives. The most frequent ‘deal-breakers’ arose from the inability 
of BAs to afford to participate in follow-on co-investment rounds (indicated by 56% of VCs, 
with over 25% considering this an “extremely frequent” ‘deal-breaker’), multiple liquidation 
provisions (54%) and the rejection by BAs of valuations for being too low and dilutive (53%). 
The five deal-breakers with the highest average score are from the “money” category. Their 
score is, except for the fifth-ranked, significantly higher than the most important “influence” 
“deal-breaker” (two-tailed Mann-Whitney test at α = 0.05). 
                                              
9 See Harrison and Mason (2000). In addition, Chan et al. (1990) defined the value of control by reference to the 
utility from terminal cash flow. Finally, Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) found that the degree of voting and board 
control retained by VCs is positively correlated. They also found that cash flow rights (meaning the fraction of a 
portfolio company’s equity value that different investors and management have a claim to) and control rights largely 
go together.  
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Table 8 
”Deal-Breakers“ mentioned by VCs. Scale from 1 to 4 with 1 = Extremely rarely and 4 = Extremely 
frequently 




Business angels can’t afford to take part in 





Business angels reject low valuations/ low % 














Business angels are more focused on dividing 




Business angels want more influence over hiring/ 





Business angels want more influence over 

























             




  Frequently 
(=3) 
  Extremely Frequently 
(=4) 
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The predominant influence of “money” criteria supports Stedler and Peters’ (2003) findings that 
BAs are increasingly becoming motivated by economic considerations; and so implies that VC’s 
goals and BA’s goals are becoming increasingly aligned. Consistent with these findings, only 
27% of the VCs surveyed say that attitudes between VCs and BAs are worsening (Question 3 of 
the survey). Dividend rights are the exception to the predominance of “money” criteria. This 
seems to reflect the insignificance of dividends in venture capital deals which are primarily 
growth focused. 
On the basis of these findings, we conclude that our second hypothesis, that VC’s goals and 
BA’s goals are becoming increasingly aligned, is supported. 
C. Hypothesis 3 
As for our first hypothesis, the empirical test for our third hypothesis, that co-investments with 
BAs do not generate higher returns than deals without a BA, is straightforward in principal: we 
asked VCs their view on whether deals with BAs typically generate higher returns (asked as 
IRRs)  than deals without BAs. This was assessed on a scale of 1 to 4; where 1 signified 
“strongly disagree” and 4, “strongly agree”.  
Before we present our findings, it is worth mentioning that identifying a relationship between 
high-performing investments and types of co-investor is complicated because of the presence of 
other factors, in particular that a number of investments will have several co-investors. 
Table IX shows the answers to these questions. The mean score was 2.0; and 76% of the VCs 
surveyed disagreed that deals with BAs typically generate higher IRRs than deals without BAs, 
with 19% strongly disagreeing. An ordered probity regression again showed that the answers of 
the VCs could not be explained by the control variables defined above (all p-values above 5%).  
 
Table 9 
Do Deals with Bas typically generate higher IRRs? 
   Percentage 
Answer  # of VCs  of VCs 
1 Strongly disagree  11  19 
2 Disagree  34  58 
3 Agree  6  10 
4 Strongly agree  2  3 
No answer  6  10 
Total 59  100 
 
Thus, our findings demonstrate that VCs do not perceive that VC-BA investments generate 
higher IRRs than pure VC investments.  
On the basis of these findings, we conclude that our third hypothesis, that co-investments with 
BAs do not generate higher returns than deals without a BA, cannot be rejected.  
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VI. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
In this study we have focused on how VCs perceive BAs in co-investments, in the German-
speaking countries. Early stage deals are likely for a VC to involve one or more BAs. 
We specifically tried to evaluate whether (from the perspective of the VCs) BAs 1) reduce risk; 
2) have aligned interests, and 3) help achieve higher returns. 
 
Our results show that: 
1.  VCs do not perceive the presence of a BA to be a source of risk reduction. Hence, either 
VCs value neither the BA’s ability to monitor investments nor their reportedly high level 
of relevant experience and networks; or VCs perceive that other sources of risks, such as 
conflicts of interests, outweigh any advantages in the BA’s involvement on a deal. 
2.  The principal objectives of a BA in a deal relate to monetary benefits. This is expressed 
by the observation that BAs’ goals relating to money are more likely to be ‘deal-
breakers’ with VCs than their goals relating to “influence”. This result contrasts with the 
widely held belief that BAs primarily invest for non-monetary reasons. Since VCs are 
also oriented towards monetary benefits, it can reasonably be inferred from this finding 
that VCs’ goals and BAs’ goals getting aligned.  
3.  According to the VCs, the level of returns (IRR) from investments with BAs is not higher 
than from those without. Given that VCs see no reduction in risk through the presence 
of BAs, the value of BAs to VCs is put seriously in doubt. 
In summary, the involvement of BAs is perceived by VCs to be irrelevant to their assessment of 
an early stage deal. It may well be that there is additional value to VCs provided by BAs in 
their capacity to identify and source new investment opportunities (Stanco and Akah, 2005), a 
service that VCs might be taking for granted when evaluating the overall differential effect of 
BAs on their investments. However, once a joint investment has been made, the presence of a 
BA seems to be of no consequence to the VC. 
BAs are regarded to be a vital source of equity financing for start-up and early stage 
entrepreneurial ventures. However, their added value to joint investments with VCs may not be 
as large as is commonly believed. This information can be valuable not only for BAs but also 
for entrepreneurs who need to plan the different financing stages of their venture. The results of 
our study are based on data from, and hence directly apply only to, the German-speaking 
countries. However, they might also be of relevance to other private equity markets around the 
world.   
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Appendix A 
Questionnaire 
Background Information on Your Fund(s) 
Total funds under management      € Mio 
Investment focus in the German-speaking countries  











Current Trends in Early Stage Deal Activity 
1.  In which year did you first co-invest with a business angel?     
Business Angels 
2.  Do you agree with the following statements?  





3.  What would you say are the top 3 characteristics you look for in business angels? If 
these top 3 include experience or time, how many years, deals or hours per month do 
you look for? 
(Please tick top 3 characteristics and insert number)  
 
Sector(s)  Stage(s) 
Biotechnology 
 
  Seed  (Concept only)   
Medical Devices 
 
  Start-up  (No Sales)   
Other Healthcare  
 
  Other Early (No Profit)   
Information Technology 
 
 Expansion  (Growth)   
Media 
 
 Later  Stage   
Telecommunications  
 
    
Retail and Consumer Products       
Other (please specify)    Other (please specify)   
Valuing Business Angels 
Deals with angels typically 
generate higher IRRs than 
deals without angels 
1 2 3 4  
 








4.  As a general rule of thumb, what range of discount rates (if using discounted cash 
flows) do you typically apply when valuing early-stage deals?  
(You may wish to distinguish between high technology and other sectors or, otherwise, 
please just complete the “Other” columns). 







5.  If you are co-investing with a business angel who has the top 3 characteristics which 
you identified above in question 3, would you change any of the following terms of 
your investment?  





6.  Have the following issues caused disagreements with business angels which led to (or 
nearly led to) early stage deals breaking down*?  
(Please circle along the scale: 1 = Extremely rarely, 4 = Extremely frequently) 
Characteristics of Business Angels  Top 3 
(Tick) 
How Many…? 
(Please insert number) 
Sector experience       Years 
R&D/ technical expertise      Years 
Sales/ marketing experience      Years 
Investment record      Early Stage Deals 
Time availability      Hours/ Month 
Good business contacts      N/A 
Other (please specify)       
Discount Rate 
(Please insert range of %s) 
Stage 
Hi Tech  Other 
Seed (Concept only)    
Start-up (No Sales)    
Other Early (No Profit)     
Expansion (Growth)     








Decrease the discount rate?  1 
 
2 3 4  











*By “breaking down”, we mean you did not invest or did not participate in follow-on rounds 
because of the angel. 
 
7.  Have the following clauses in your investment/shareholder agreement caused 
disagreements with business angels which led to (or nearly led to) early stage deals 
breaking-down? 









*Please see list of definitions in the Annexure at the back of this questionnaire. 
Difficult Issues for Business Angels 
Business angels reject low 




2 3 4 
Business angels want more 




2 3 4 
Business angels can’t afford to 




2 3 4 
Business angels want more 
influence over operations/ strategy 
of the business 
1 
 
2 3 4 
Business angels want more control 
in determining the terms and 
timing of exit 
1 
 
2 3 4 
Business angels are more focused 




2 3 4 
Other (please specify)  1 
 
2 3 4 
Difficult VC Clauses for Business Angels* 
Special voting rights on changes to 
management  
1 2 3 4 
Special voting rights on changes to 
strategy 
1 2 3 4 
Rights to appoint a board member  1  2  3  4 
Dividend rights 
 
1 2 3 4 
Ratchets and other dilution 
provisions 
1 2 3 4 
Multiple  liquidation  provisions  1 2 3 4 
Other (please specify)  1  2  3  4  
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Past Performance 
8.  In the last 3 years, how many early stage deals did you invest in? How many were with 












  *Please see list of EVCA definitions in the Annexure at the back of this questionnaire. 
















































































An investor who provides capital and support (through advice, contacts, or hands-on work) to 
an early-stage company. Business angels are commonly ex-entrepreneurs or business managers 
themselves. 
Source: Amis, David, Stevenson, Howard and Liechtenstein, Heinrich. Winning Angels: Sieben 





Seed: Financing provided to research, assess and develop an initial concept before a business 
has reached the start-up phase. 
Start-Up/Early-Stage 
Start-up: Financing provided to companies for product development and initial marketing. 
Companies may be in the process of being set up or may have been in business for a short time, 
but have not sold their product commercially.  
 
Other Early-Stage: Financing to companies that have completed the product development 
stage and require further funds to initiate commercial manufacturing and sales. They will not 
yet be generating a profit. 
Expansion 
Expansion: Financing provided for the growth and expansion of an operating company, which 
may or may not be breaking even or trading profitably. Capital may be used to finance 
increased production capacity, market or product development, and/or to provide additional 
working capital. 
 
Bridge Financing: Financing made available to a company in the period of transition from 
being privately owned to being publicly quoted. 
 
Rescue/Turnaround: Financing made available to an existing business which has experienced 
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Bases of Valuation Formulae 
DCF: Discounted Cash Flows 
EBIT: Earnings Before Interest & Tax 
Free Cash Flow: Free Cash Flow After Tax & Before Interest 
 
Contractual Clauses 
Board rights: e.g. investors have the right to appoint one or more members of the board.  
Special voting rights on restricted transactions: e.g. changes in the constitution, capital 
structure (including certain share transfers and issues), board or business of the investee 
company; transactions over a certain value; or proposed exits. 
Pre-emption rights (i.e. rights of first refusal) on certain share transfers and issues.  
 
Good (or involuntary) and bad (or voluntary) leaver provisions: e.g. if a shareholder wants to 
exit because of illness or retirement (a ‘good leaver’), he can keep his shares or sell to the other 
shareholders at (market) value; however, if he wants to exit because of a non-‘good leaver’ 
reason, then he must sell, at a lower value. 
 
Royalty rights: e.g. investors earn a percentage of the revenues of the business. 
 
Dividend rights: e.g. investors get a preferential, cumulative and/or deferred dividend. 
 
Tag along: e.g. no shareholder can transfer a given percentage of all the shares in the invested 
company, unless the other shareholders also have the opportunity to sell on the same terms. 
 
Drag along: e.g. a shareholder, who proposes to transfer a given percentage of all the shares in 
the company, has the right to force the other shareholders to sell on the same terms. 
 
Up and/or down ratchets:  mechanisms by which the eventual equity allocations amongst 
classes of shareholders will go up or down depending on the future performance of the invested 
company or the rate of return achieved by the private equity investor. 
 
Multiple liquidations:  mechanisms by which, on any liquidation or exit event, the private 
equity investor receives an amount equal to a given multiple of his investment.  
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